The hard problem of consciousness arises in most incarnations of present day physicalism. Why should certain physical processes necessarily be accompanied by experience? One possible response is that physicalism itself should be modified in order to accommodate experience: But, modified how? In the present work, we investigate whether an ontology derived from quantum field theory can help resolve the hard problem. We begin with the assumption that experience cannot exist without being accompanied  by a subject of experience (SoE). In recent years, Strawson has elaborately defended the notion of a thin subject - an SoE which exhibits a phenomenal unity with different types of content (sensations, perceptions, thoughts etc.) occurring during its (brief) temporal existence. Next, following Stoljar, we invoke our ignorance of the true physical as the reason for the explanatory gap between present day physical processes (events, properties) and experience. We are therefore permitted to conceive of thin subjects as related to the physical via a new, yet to be elaborated relation. While this is difficult to conceive under most varieties of classical physics, we argue that this may not be the case under certain quantum field theory (QFT) ontologies. We suggest that the relation binding an SoE to the physical is akin to the relation between a particle and (quantum) field. In QFT, unlike in quantum mechanics, fields behave like particles under certain circumstances. The particle-field relation is central to QFT. Fundamental issues remain as to whether particles and fields are substances, tropes, properties or something else entirely. There are important no-go theorems in QFT such as Malament's which seem to exclude the possibility of spatio-temporally localized particles at all. These are typically augmented with FAPP (for all practical purposes) principles in which particles reappear with a FAPP “as if” status despite the underlying theory not allowing for their possibility. In quantum field theory, a particle is conceived as a coherent excitation of a field. Under the right set of circumstances, a particle coalesces out of a field and dissipates. We suggest that an SoE can be conceived as akin to a particle, a SelfOn, which coalesces out of quantum fields, persists for a brief period of time and then dissipates in a manner similar to the phenomenology of a thin subject. Experiences are physical properties of selfons with the constraint that selfons belonging to the same natural kind will have similar experiences. While it is odd at first glance to conceive of subjects of experience as akin to particles, the spatial and temporal unity exhibited by particles as opposed to fields and the expectation that selfons are akin to new kinds of particles, paves the way for cementing this notion. Next, we detail the impact of various no-go theorems on the existence of selfons with particular focus on spatio-temporal localization. With analytic philosophy still struggling to come to terms with the ontologies underlying quantum field theory, we believe the time is ripe to revise the foundations of matter and in doing so, dissolve the mind-body problem.