The following curious fact can be gleaned from meditative
phenomenology. When we are aware of images, thoughts, feelings and
sensations, we are aware of images, thoughts, feelings and sensations.
When we are unaware of these, we are simply unaware. And, when awareness
is present, we seem to have the freedom to pay modulated attention to
the channels of sensation, perception, emotion, cognition and visualization.
For example, when thought is the focus of awareness, there seems to be 
a constant struggle between awareness of thought and awareness lost in
thought. When there is no focus, awareness can equally pay attention to
different channels until awareness itself is lost. While the above 
description is now standard fare in the meditative traditions, the
intersubjective case is less straightforward. For example, in intense
dialog with an other, it is much more difficult to maintain a detached and
stable awareness of the conversation. Instead, when awareness is present,
it is more likely to be focused on one end of the conversation rather 
than equally on both. Based on these observations, we draw a sharp 
distinction between intersubjective phenomenology and private
phenomenology. 

Moving over to ontology, we agree with Strawson that moments in which awareness
is present constitute the best evidence for 'a thing' in some robust sense. 
This move replaces a traditional materialist ontology with one in 
which at rock bottom, there are things which are subjects of experience. When
awareness is present, the subject exists. And in a move away from traditional
idealist ontologies, the rock bottom things are bare subjects which are not 
to be confused with mind or mental events. Since, presumably there is not 
just a single subject, we are driven to postulate an intersubjective mesh
of subjects. In such an intersubjective mesh, qualia correspond to that 
which arise in the awareness of one subject while engaged 'in dialog' with 
others. This takes care of the fundamental level in a manner highly reminiscent
of pan proto-psychism. However, we are left with the problem of explaining
awareness and qualia in mid-level beings such as ourselves. This 'combination
problem' is the hardest for any fundamental approach. We propose that the
intersubjective mesh can be divided into hierarchical and heterarchical 
components. Focusing on the hierarchical side, the interaction between levels
is modeled after our own private phenomenology as described  above. Our 
awareness then corresponds to a mid level subject which, when present, is 
engaged with lower-level subjects corresponding to the different channels of 
sensation, perception, emotion, cognition and visualization. And the 
heterarchical side similarly follows the intersubjective phenomenolgy.
Same-level exchanges in our case corresponds to interaction between mid-level
subjects at our level. It should be stressed that awareness and therefore 
a subject at every level is momentary and can wink in and out of existence.
Spatio-temporal scales can obviously vary across levels with design hints
available from meditative phenomenology. The resulting framework can best 
be described as a pan-aware emergentist ontology which distinguishes it from the
varieties of materialism, idealism, property dualism and pan proto-psychism.